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Introduction. The Exclusive-Or or Xor operation is defined to be linear operation in cryptography. Linear operations are used to give two exact values, 0 and 1, in operation between two same and different bits respectively in Boolean Logic or Switching Logic. So if a linear relation exists between all 4-bit plain text bit pattern and the corresponding cipher-text 4-bit bit pattern then the existing relation between them is easy to determine. The idea of using linear relations to analyze the randomization property of a cipher was introduced by Matsui in 1994 for cryptanalysis reduced round DES cipher [1] . Later Heys [2] extended the idea towards 4-bit S-Boxes in his tutorial on linear and Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-Boxes.
A 4-bit S-Box consists of 16 array elements whose indices are considered as 4-bit inputs corresponding to sequential hex values from of 0 to f. The output data corresponding to each array indices are supposed to have 4-bit sequential or non-sequential hex values between 0 and f. Such an S-Box with 4-bit input and 4-bit output are called a Bijective S-Box [3] . Non-bijective 4-bit S-Boxes are those whose inputs may consist of number of bits more than four bits. For all 4-bit Bijective S-Boxes, the four input vectors are same and the output would be composed of four Boolean functions (BFs) giving four 16-bit output column vectors whose row-wise 4 bits assume hex values lying between 0 and f. The number of possible S-boxes is obtained as factorial 16 (16!) following the permutation of 16 hex digits between 0 and f. a 4-bit S-box can be represented by a 4-valued Boolean function following the norms of presentation of multi-valued Boolean function [4] .
For Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-Boxes, every 4-bit linear relations are tested for a particular 4-bit S-Box. The presence of each 4-bit unique linear relation is checked by satisfaction of each of them for all 16, 4-bit unique input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns, generated from the index of each element and each element respectively of that particular 4-bit S-Box. If they are satisfied 8 times out of 16 operations for all 4-bit unique input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns, then the existence of the 4-bit linear equation is at a stake, since the probability of presence and absence of a 4-bit linear relation both are (= 8/16) ½. If a 4-bit linear equation is satisfied 0 times then it can be concluded that the given 4-bit linear relation is absent for that particular 4-bit bijective S-Box. If a 4-bit linear equation is satisfied 16 times then it can also be concluded that the given 4-bit linear relation is present for that particular 4-bit S-Box. In both the cases full information is adverted to the cryptanalysts. The concept of Probability Bias was introduced to predict the randomization ability of that 4-bit SBox from the probability of presence or absence of unique 4-bit linear relations. The result is better for cryptanalysts if the probability of presence or absences of unique 4-bit linear equations are far away from ½ or near to 0 or 1. If the probabilities of presence or absence, of all unique 4-bit linear relations are ½ or close to ½, then the 4-bit S-Box is said to be linear cryptanalysis immune, since the existence of maximum 4-bit linear relations for that 4-bit S-Box is hard to predict. Heys also introduced the concept of Linear Approximation Table ( LAT) in which the numbers of times, each 4-bit unique linear relation have been satisfied for all 16, unique 4-bit input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns, of a crypto S-box are noted. The result is better for a cryptanalysts if the numbers of 8s in the table are less. If numbers of 8s are much more than the other numbers in the table then the 4-bit S-Box is said to be more linear cryptanalysis immune.
In this paper a new technique to find the existing Linear Relations or Linear Approximations for a particular 4-bit Bijective SBox has been introduced. If the nonlinear part of the ANF equation of a 4-bit output BF is absent or calculated to be 0 then the equation is termed as a Linear Relation or Approximation. Searching for number of existing linear relations through this method is ended up with Number of Existing Linear Relations. I.e. the goal to conclude the security of a 4-bit bijective S-Box is attended in a very lucid manner by this method.
The review of and Algebraic Normal Form of 4-bit BFs and Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Bijective S-Boxes have been given or introduced in a very lucid manner in section 2. The new Cryptanalysis method or Linear Approximation Analysis has been described in section 3. The algorithm is given in section 4. The analysis of results and security Criterion for 4-bit Bijective SBoxes has been given in section 5. The conclusion has been made in section 6. The references are elaborated in section 7. The analysis of 32 4-bit Bijective Crypto S-Boxes of Data Encryption Standard has been shown in Appendix.
Review of Algebraic Normal Form and Linear Cryptanalysis.
The review of algebraic Normal form or ANF of 4-bit BFs is given in subsection 2.1. and a lucid review of Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Bijective Crypto S-Boxes is given in subsection 2.2.
A review of Boolean Functions (BF) and its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)
A 4-bit Boolean Function (BF) accepts 4 bits as input {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 }having 16 combinations of decimal values varying between 0 and 15 and provides 1-bit output for each combination of input. The input-output relation is given in a Truth Table  which 
where x represents the decimal value or the hex value of 4 input bits represented by {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 }, BF assumes 1-bit output, '.' and '+' represent AND and XOR operations respectively. Here a 0 is a constant coefficient, (a 1 to a 4 ) are 4 linear coefficients, and (a 5 to a 15 ) are 11 nonlinear coefficients of which (a 5 to a 10 ) are 6 non-linear coefficients of 6 terms with 2-AND-operated-input-bits, (a 11 to a 14 ) are 4 nonlinear coefficients of 4 terms with 3-AND-operated-input-bits and a 15 is a non-linear coefficient of one term with 4-AND-operated-input-bits. The 16 binary ANF coefficients, from a 0 to a 15 are marked respectively as anf.bit0 to anf.bit15 in ANF representation and are evaluated from the 16-bit output vector of a BF designated as bf.bit0 to bf.bit15 using the following relations as given in eq. (2), anf.bit0 = bf.bit0; anf.bit1 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit8; anf.bit2 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit4; anf.bit3 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit2; anf.bit4 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit1; anf.bit5 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + bf.bit12; anf.bit6 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit3 + bf.bit10; anf.bit7 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit9; anf.bit8 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + bf.bit6; anf.bit9 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit5; anf.bit10 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit3; anf.bit11 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit8 + bf.bit14; anf.bit12 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit9 + bf.bit13; anf.bit13 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit10 + bf.bit11; anf.bit14 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit8 + anf.bit9 + anf.bit10 + bf.bit7; anf.bit15 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit8 + anf.bit9 + anf.bit10 + anf.bit11 + anf.bit12 + anf.bit13 + anf.bit14 + bf.bit15 … (2)
The DEBF (Decimal Equivalent of BF) varies from 0 through 65535 and each decimal value is converted to a 16-bit binary output of the Boolean function from bf.bit0 through bf.bit15. Based on the binary output of a BF, the ANF coefficients from anf.bit0 through anf.bit15 are calculated sequentially using eq. (2). 
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Relation between 4-bit S-Boxes and 4-bit Boolean Functions (4-bit BFs). Index of Each element of a 4-bit
bijective crypto S-Box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of [8] . The decimal equivalent of each input BF and output BF are noted at column H of respective rows. Table. 
Row Column
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H. Decimal Equivalent 1 Index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 2 IBF4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 00255 3 IBF3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 03855 4 IBF2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 13107 5 IBF1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 21845 6 S-Box E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7 7 OBF4 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 42836 8 OBF3 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 58425 9 OBF2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 36577 A OBF1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
IPVs and OPVs for given S-Box
The IPEs or Input Equations are possible xored terms that can be formed using four IPVs 4, 3, 2 and 1. On the other hand OPEs are possible xored terms that can be formed using four OPVs 4, 3, 2 and 1. All IPEs and OPEs are listed under the column and also row heading (IPE = OPE) from row 2 through H and column 1 through G respectively. Each cell is a linear equation equating IPE to OPE. Such as L 1+2+4,2+3 is the linear equation formed by IPE '1+2+3' i.e. the xored combination of three IPVs 1, 2 and 3 and OPE '2+3' i.e. the xored combination of two OPBFs 2 and 3. The Example of 256 possible 4-bit Linear Equations are shown in Table 4 . Columns  1  2  3  4  5  1  IPE = OPE  0  1  2  3  4  2 Table ( Table. 4. then it is called as Linear Approximation Table or LAT.
Rows
0 L 0,0 L 0,1 L 0,2 L 0,3 L 0,4 3 1 L 1,0 L 1,1 L 1,2 L 1,3 L 1,4 4 2 L 2,0 L 2,1 L 2,2 L 2,3 L 2,4 5 3 L 3,0 L 3,1 L 3,2 L 3,3 L 3,4 6 4 L 4,0 L 4,1 L 4,2 L 4,3 L 4,4 7 1+2 L 1+2,0 L 1+2,1 L 1+2,2 L 1+2,3 L 1+2,4 8 1+3 L 1+3,0 L 1+3,1 L 1+3,2 L 1+3,3 L 1+3,4 9 1+4 L 1+4,0 L 1+4,1 L 1+4,2 L 1+4,3 L 1+4,4 A 2+3 L 2+3,0 L 2+3,1 L 2+3,2 L 2+3,3 L 2+3,4 B 2+4 L 2+4,0 L 2+4,1 L 2+4,2 L 2+4,3 L 2+4,4 C 3+4 L 3+4,0 L 3+4,1 L 3+4,2 L 3+4,3 L 3+4,4 D 1+2+3 L 1+2+3,0 L 1+2+3,1 L 1+2+3,2 L 1+2+3,3 L 1+2+3,4 E 1+2+4 L 1+2+4,0 L 1+2+4,1 L 1+2+4,2 L 1+2+4,3 L 1+2+4,4 F 1+3+4 L 1+3+4,0 L 1+3+4,1 L 1+3+4,2 L 1+3+4,3 L 1+3+4,4 G 2+3+4 L 2+3+4,0 L 2+3+4,1 L 2+3+4,2 L 2+3+4,3 L 2+3+4,4 H 1+2+3+4 L 1+2+3+4,0 L 1+2+3+4,1 L 1+2+3+4,2 L 1+2+3+4,3 L 1+2+3+4,4
Linear Approximation
Linear Approximation Analysis:
A Bijective Crypto S-Box (1 st 4-bit S-Box out of 32 4-bit S-Boxes of DES) has been described in sub-section 2.2.1. The Table for four input vectors, Output BFs and corresponding ANFs has been depicted in sub-section 3.2. The analysis has been described in sub-section 3.3. The result of Analysis has been given in sub-section 3.4. C  1100  1000  C  1100  5  0101  0101  D  1101  9  1001  0010  E  1110  0  0000  1010  F  1111  7  0111  0000   Table. In this section The Analysis of result is described in sub-section 5.1. and The Security Criterion For 4-bit Bijective Crypto S-Boxes are described in subsection 5.2.
Input Vectors (IPVs
Analysis of Result.
The value of n C r is maximum when the value of r is ½ of the value of n (when n is even). Here the maximum number of linear approximations is 64. So if the total satisfaction of linear equation is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 linear equations is largest. Means if the total satisfaction is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 possible linear equations is 64 C 32. That is maximum number of possible sets of linear equations. If the value of total No of Linear Approximations with BF1 is closed to 32 then it is more cryptanalysis immune. Since the number of possible sets of linear equations are too large to calculate. As the value of goes close to 0 or 64 it reduces the sets of possible linear equations to search for which reduces the effort to search for the linear equations present in a particular 4-bit S-Box. In this example total satisfaction is 18 out of 64 . Which means the given 4-bit S-Box is not a good 4 bit S-Box or not a good Crypt analytically immune S-Box.
APPENDIX
In this section security analysis of 32 4-bit DES S-Boxes has been carried out. The analysis is demonstrated in Table. 1. of Appendix. 
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